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WHAT IF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE WROTE THIS?
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND COPYRIGHT LAW
Victor M. Palace† *
Abstract
The increasing sophistication and proliferation of artificial
intelligence has given rise to a provoking question in copyright law: Who
is the copyright owner of a work created by autonomous artificial
intelligence? In other words, when a machine learns, thinks, and acts
without human input, and it creates a work, what person should own the
copyright, if any? This Note explains why this is a pressing question and
why current laws and practices fail to address the issue. It then analyzes
the arguments for and against the possible choices: the artificial
intelligence, the user, the programmer, the company that owns the
artificial intelligence, and entrance into the public domain. Finally, this
Note arrives at the conclusion that the work’s immediate entrance into
the public domain is the solution.
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INTRODUCTION
It is the dawn of a new era: the era of artificial intelligence.1 For
millions of years, the human brain has been the most complex and most
powerful machine in the world. Analytical reasoning, imagination, and
intuition have allowed humans to thrive and rise to the top. Indeed,
society has long recognized the value of the human intellect by affording
legal protection to intellectual creations. The Founding Fathers protected
intellectual creations under the Patent and Copyright Clause of the United
States Constitution, which seeks “[t]o promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”2 As
complex and powerful as the human brain is, however, current
technology is sometimes able to match, if not surpass, its capabilities.
This has led to a provoking question in copyright law: Who is the
copyright owner of a work created by autonomous artificial intelligence?
To answer this, an example of “autonomous artificial intelligence” is
helpful. Imagine artificial intelligence that does not require any human
input to learn, think, or act. Like a baby, it starts out utterly naïve and
incapable of doing anything of substance. It tries to perform a task and
fails, but—much like a child—it learns. This repeats over and over. After
some time, not only has the machine mastered the task, it has become one
of the world’s best.
This is the story of AlphaGo Zero, the first artificial intelligence to
learn tabula rasa—meaning from a “clean slate,” without any human
1. This Note uses “artificial intelligence” to refer to a computer algorithm capable of
accomplishing tasks that generally require human intelligence, such as creating pictures, songs,
and writings. See Artificial Intelligence, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, https://en.oxford
dictionaries.com/definition/us/artificial_intelligence [https://perma.cc/XEW2-YVKA] (defining
“artificial intelligence” as “[t]he theory and development of computer systems able to perform
tasks that normally require human intelligence, such as visual perception, speech recognition,
decision-making, and translation between languages”).
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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input.3 AlphaGo Zero started out with no prior knowledge of the game
Go except for its rules.4 Nonetheless, after forty days of playing against
itself, it outperformed the algorithm that defeated the world’s best human
Go player.5 This is the type of artificial intelligence on which this Note
focuses. For purposes of this Note, “autonomous artificial intelligence”
is artificial intelligence where the only human inputs are the initial
algorithm and the “rules”; the machine performs the learning, thinking,
and acting. Legal tension arises from the fact that it is not immediately
clear who owns the copyright of a work created by such a machine.
To resolve this, Congress and the federal courts may choose to grant
the copyright for such works to the artificial intelligence, the user, the
programmer, or the artificial intelligence company. Or they may choose
to grant no copyright at all; that is, they may choose to place such works
into the public domain immediately upon creation, where everyone would
be free to use them. This Note explains why this tension is a pressing
issue, why current copyright law fails to address it, and why the last
choice, immediate entrance into the public domain, is the solution.
Part I explains why Congress or the federal courts will soon have to
make this choice. It provides a brief historical outline and current
developments regarding computers to conclude that the sophistication of
artificial intelligence will continue to increase. This Part also discusses
the increasing popularity of artificial intelligence to highlight the urgency
of the issue. It concludes that the continuing increase in sophistication
and popularity of artificial intelligence will soon force Congress or the
federal courts to act.
Part II explains why current copyright law fails to address the
question. It discusses congressional silence, judicial reluctance, and the
Copyright Office’s rules. This Part then explains why the only source of
guidance, the Copyright Office’s rules, is based on law that is blind to the
issue. It concludes that the Copyright Office’s rules are ambiguous and
antiquated and thus fail to properly answer the question.
Part III explains the arguments for and against the possible choices:
the artificial intelligence, the user, the programmer, the company that
owns the artificial intelligence, and entrance into the public domain. It
then compares the arguments to conclude that immediate entrance into
the public domain is the answer.
3. See Demis Hassabis & David Silver, AlphaGo Zero: Learning From Scratch,
DEEPMIND, https://deepmind.com/blog/alphago-zero-learning-scratch/ [https://perma.cc/8LYXJSSN].
4. Id.
5. Id.
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I. CONGRESS OR THE FEDERAL COURTS WILL SOON BE REQUIRED TO
SAY WHO OWNS THE COPYRIGHT FOR WORKS MADE BY AUTONOMOUS
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
This Part explains the urgency of the copyright ownership question
for works created by autonomous artificial intelligence. To do this, it
discusses two ever-increasing aspects of artificial intelligence:
sophistication and popularity.
A. The Sophistication of Artificial Intelligence Will Continue
to Increase
In 1965, the Register of Copyrights reported to Congress his concerns
about computer-generated work.6 The report stated that the rise of
computer technology brought with it a difficult copyright question: For a
work that is partly generated by a computer, where is the line between
human and computer authorship?7 Apparently perturbed by the question,
Congress established the National Commission on New Technological
Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU) to research, among other things,
this issue.8 At the time, CONTU found the answer “obvious” because
artificial intelligence had not yet come to be.9 It stated that a “computer,
like a camera or a typewriter, is an inert instrument, capable of
functioning only when activated either directly or indirectly by a
human.”10 Thus, CONTU argued, the copyright always belonged to the
user.11 However, the technological landscape has change dramatically
since then.
By the 1980s, computer-generated works had become popular.12 By
the 1990s, computers were capable of originality. For example, Racter,13
6. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, SIXTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF
C OPYRIGHTS 5 (1965), https://www.copyright.gov/reports/annual/archive/ar -1965.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E55P-XEUF].
7. See id.
8. National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works, Pub. L. No.
93-573, § 201, 88 Stat. 1873 (1974).
9. NAT’L COMM’N ON NEW TECH. USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS 44–45 (1978),
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015026832934 [https://perma.cc/RUA7-AT2J].
10. Id. at 44.
11. Id. at 45.
12. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Allocating Ownership Rights in Computer-Generated
Works, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 1185, 1196 (1986) (stating that in 1986 “there [was] no question but
that many machine-generated works [were] already available, and that in the future they [were]
expected to become ever more complex, sophisticated and valuable”).
13. See Terry Nasta, Thief of Arts, PC MAG., Dec. 25, 1984, at 62, https://books.google.
com/books?id=azbgSlPdJawC&lpg=PP1&pg=PA62 [https://perma.cc/38HU-FMQ9] (reviewing
RACTER, THE POLICEMAN’S BEARD IS HALF CONSTRUCTED (1984)).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol71/iss1/5

4

Palace: What if Artificial Intelligence Wrote This? Artificial Intelligen

2019]

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND COPYRIGHT LAW

221

a computer program designed to generate prose and poetry, 14 wrote the
book The Policeman’s Beard is Half Constructed.15 Similarly, Hal,16 a
computer program designed to write like American author Jacqueline
Susann,17 co-wrote the book Just This Once.18 Finally, Creativity
Machine,19 itself a patented device,20 created an invention that was later
patented.21 Nowadays, artificial intelligence is present in almost every
aspect of daily life, including travel-booking,22 psychological therapy,23
and even legal work.24 Not surprisingly, “45% of 800 executives
surveyed . . . said they expected an artificial intelligence machine will sit
on a company’s board of directors by the year 2025.”25 Likewise, “[35%]
of surveyed law firm leaders say they can envision first-year associates
being replaced by artificial intelligence . . . and [47%] said they can
envision paralegals being replaced.”26 And perhaps most interestingly,
“[c]ombined results from surveys of artificial intelligence experts
14. See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 5.01[A]
(Matthew Bender & Co. 2018) (1963).
15. RACTER, THE POLICEMAN’S BEARD IS HALF CONSTRUCTED (1984).
16. See John Boudreau, A Romance Novel with Byte: Author Teams Ups with Computer to
Write Book in Steamy Style of Jacqueline Susann, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 11, 1993),
http://articles.latimes.com/1993-08-11/news/vw-22645_1_jacqueline-susann [https://perma.cc/
J2ZL-TTBK].
17. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 14; Tal Vigderson, Note, Hamlet II: The Sequel?
The Rights of Authors vs. Computer-Generated “Read-Alike” Works, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 401,
402–03 (1994).
18. SCOTT FRENCH & HAL, JUST THIS ONCE (1993).
19. See Ryan Abbott, I Think, Therefore I Invent: Creative Computers and the Future of
Patent Law, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1079, 1085 (2016).
20. See U.S. Patent No. 5,659,666 (filed Oct. 13, 1994).
21. See U.S. Patent No. 5,852,815 (filed May 15, 1998).
22. See Elaine Glusac, Meet Your New Data-Driven Travel Agent, N.Y. TIMES (July 10,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/10/travel/meet-your-next-travel-agent-diy-artificialintelligence.html [https://perma.cc/59BN-RNBP].
23. See, e.g., Gale M. Lucas et al., It’s Only a Computer: Virtual Humans Increase
Willingness to Disclose, 37 COMPUTERS HUM. BEHAV. 94, 94 (2014).
24. See Steve Lohr, A.I. Is Doing Legal Work. But It Won’t Replace Lawyers, Yet., N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/19/technology/lawyers-artificialintelligence.html [https://perma.cc/AF5Y-8BC6].
25. Lucy Marcus, Is This a Truly Robot-Proof Job?, BBC NEWS (Sept. 22, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/capital/story/20150921-is-this-a-truly-robot-proof-job [https://perma.cc/
S9VZ-VM24].
26. Debra Weiss, Will Newbie Associates Be Replaced by Watson? 35% Of Law Firm
Leaders Can Envision It, ABA J. (Oct. 26, 2015, 7:42 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/
article/will_associates_be_replaced_by_watson_computing_35_percent_of_law_firm_lead/
[https://perma.cc/V4S9-52TV].
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estimate a 50% chance of human-level machine intelligence by 2040 and
a 90% probability by 2075.”27
Although current technology seems to be approaching the physical
limit of computational power per unit area (a trend called “the end of
Moore’s law”28),29 experts nonetheless believe that computational power
will continue to increase due to breakthroughs in other areas of computer
engineering.30 Moreover, the advent of “quantum computing”31 is
expected to revolutionize artificial intelligence—Microsoft, for example,
has stated that its artificial intelligence would learn at least “30 times
faster” as a result of quantum computing.32 In short, artificial intelligence
will continue to become more and more sophisticated, increasingly
blurring the line between human and computer authorship, until Congress
or the federal courts are forced to act.
B. Works Created by Artificial Intelligence Are Everywhere
Due to the tremendous advances in artificial intelligence, works
subject to copyright laws are now regularly created by autonomous
algorithms. This is prominent in three areas: music,33 pictures,34 and
27. Robert C. Denicola, Ex Machina: Copyright Protection for Computer-Generated
Works, 69 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 251, 256 (2016).
28. “Moore’s law” is named after Gordon E. Moore, who predicted that the number of
transistors per chip (which is proportional to computational power) would double every two years.
See Thomas L. Friedman, Moore’s Law Turns 50, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/13/opinion/thomas-friedman-moores-law-turns-50.html
[https://perma.cc/2CEF-KHFN].
29. See Thomas N. Theis & H.-S. Philip Wong, The End of Moore's Law: A New Beginning
for Information Technology, 19 COMPUTING SCI. & ENGINEERING 41, 41 (2016).
30. See id. at 44 (commenting that research will simply switch from miniaturization to new
devices, integration techniques, and architectures).
31. “Quantum computing” refers to the use of subatomic particles in computing instead of
conventional silicon-based transistors. See Quantum Computer, OXFORD DICTIONARIES,
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/quantum_computer [https://perma.cc/7HKQ-Z8YG].
32. Allison Linn, With New Microsoft Breakthroughs, General Purpose Quantum
Computing Moves Closer to Reality, MICROSOFT (Sept. 25, 2017), https://news.microsoft.com/
features/new-microsoft-breakthroughs-general-purpose-quantum-computing-moves-closerreality/ [https://perma.cc/VQL2-6YVK].
33. Musical works have long received the protection of copyright laws. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C.
§ 106(4), (6) (2012) (granting copyright owners the exclusive right “to perform the copyrighted
[musical] work publicly”).
34. As with musical works, pictorial works have long been protected by copyright laws.
See, e.g., id. § 106(5) (granting copyright owners the exclusive right “to display the copyrighted
[pictorial] work publicly”).
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writings.35 The first category is music. Watson Beat,36 Jukedeck,37 and
WaveNet38 are examples of artificial intelligence systems capable of
creating music without any human input.39 Watson Beat, for example,
“composes music by ‘listening’ to at least 20 seconds of music, and then
creates new tracks.”40 The results are tracks that cost a fraction of what
hiring a musician would, and the tracks can be used as background music
for videos, games, and commercials.41 A famous example of Watson
Beat’s work is the song Not Easy,42 which was created by Grammynominated producer Alex da Kid in collaboration with Watson Beat.43
“Watson Beat . . . looked at composition of [over 26,000 Billboard Hot
100 songs] to find useful patterns between various keys, chord
progressions and genres.”44 Then, Alex would issue commands to
Watson Beat like, “[g]ive me something that sounds romantic,” or, “give
me something that sounds like something I want to dance to.”45 Watson
Beat would then produce an “original piece” that Alex would use as
inspiration.46
The next category is pictures. DeepDream47 is an example of artificial
intelligence capable of creating original pictures without human
35. As with musical and pictorial works, literary works have long received the protection
of copyright laws. See, e.g., id. (granting copyright owners the exclusive right “to display the
copyrighted [literary] work publicly”).
36. See Kelly Shi, Beats by AI, IBM RES. (July 27, 2016), https://www.ibm.com/
blogs/research/2016/07/beats-by-ai/ [https://perma.cc/S32U-8LBP].
37. See About, JUKEDECK, https://www.jukedeck.com/about [https://perma.cc/3LN8-887X].
38. See Aäron van den Oord et al., WaveNet: A Generative Model for Raw Audio,
DEEPMIND (Sept. 8, 2016), https://deepmind.com/blog/wavenet-generative-model-raw-audio/
[https://perma.cc/9HW6-AY72].
39. See Alex Marshall, From Jingles to Pop Hits, A.I. Is Music to Some Ears,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/22/arts/music/jukedeck-artificialintelligence-songwriting.html [https://perma.cc/S5B7-KPQ9].
40. Shi, supra note 36.
41. See Marshall, supra note 39.
42. ALEX DA KID, NOT EASY (KIDinaKORNER 2016), https://open.spotify.com/album/
4K6Zqkm3dZQncMmunPIl9O [https://perma.cc/8RWQ-UNFQ] (stream through Spotify).
43. See A Collaboration by Alex Da Kid + IBM Watson, IBM, https://www.ibm.com/
watson/music/noteasy/ [https://perma.cc/5VZQ-GTBX].
44. Id.
45. IBM Cognitive Business, Alex Da Kid and Watson Make Music Together, MEDIUM
(Feb. 1, 2017), https://medium.com/cognitivebusiness/alex-da-kid-and-watson-make-music-together
-c251908c1bca [https://perma.cc/4JXZ-8LHC].
46. Id.
47. DEEP DREAM GENERATOR, https://deepdreamgenerator.com/ [https://perma.cc/4ZAZ4TX7].
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direction.48 In a nutshell, DeepDream analyzes a photograph, guesses
what it is, and then enhances certain features based on the guess.49 The
results are “haunting, hallucinogenic imagescapes”50 that resemble the
original photographs but are nonetheless uniquely different.51 Moreover,
DeepDream is able to create pictures seemingly out of nothing by
interpreting images of random noise, zooming in, and interpreting and
zooming in repeatedly.52 The results are dream-like pictures that are
purely the product of DeepDream’s artificial intelligence.53
The final category is writings. Automated Insights54 and Narrative
Science55 are two companies that allow customers to create automated
narratives, “many with no human intervention.”56 The following is an
example of Narrative Science’s work, which describes the third quarter
of the 2011 game between the Wisconsin Badgers and the University of
Nevada, Las Vegas, (UNLV) Rebels:
Wisconsin appears to be in the driver’s seat en route to a win,
as it leads 51-10 after the third quarter.
Wisconsin added to its lead when Russell Wilson found
Jacob Pedersen for an eight-yard touchdown to make the
score 44-3. The Badgers started the drive at UNLV’s 28-yard
line thanks to a Jared Abbrederis punt return.
A one-yard touchdown run by Montee Ball capped off a twoplay, 42-yard drive and extended Wisconsin’s lead to 51-3.
The drive took 42 seconds. The key play on the drive was a
41-yard pass from Wilson to Bradie Ewing. A punt return
gave the Badgers good starting field position at UNLV’s 42yard line.
A 69-yard drive that ended when Caleb Herring found
Phillip Payne from six yards out helped UNLV narrow the
48. See Alexander Mordvintsev et al., Inceptionism: Going Deeper into Neural Networks,
GOOGLE RES. BLOG (June 17, 2015), https://research.googleblog.com/2015/06/inceptionismgoing-deeper-into-neural.html [https://perma.cc/YQ5X-2NE9].
49. See Cade Metz, How A.I. Is Creating Building Blocks to Reshape Music and Art, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/14/arts/design/google-how-ai-createsnew-music-and-new-artists-project-magenta.html [https://perma.cc/QLQ8-VLSR].
50. Id.
51. See Mordvintsev et al., supra note 48.
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. AUTOMATED INSIGHTS, https://automatedinsights.com/ [https://perma.cc/2AZX-C2BY].
55. NARRATIVE SCI., https://narrativescience.com/ [https://perma.cc/KE96-YAHW].
56. Shelley Podolny, Opinion, If an Algorithm Wrote This, How Would You Even Know?,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/08/opinion/sunday/if-analgorithm-wrote-this-how-would-you-even-know.html [https://perma.cc/S4VN-Q29U].
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deficit to 51-10. The Rebels threw just three passes on the
drive.
UNLV will start the fourth quarter with the ball at the 41yard line.57
Such works have become very popular. The Associated Press, for
example, uses Automated Insights to produce more than 3,000 financial
reports per quarter, and Forbes uses Narrative Science for similar
efforts.58
In conclusion, due to the increasing popularity and sophistication of
artificial intelligence, Congress or the federal courts will soon be required
to declare the copyright owner of works created by autonomous artificial
intelligence.
II. CURRENT COPYRIGHT LAWS FAIL TO ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF
COPYRIGHT OWNERSHIP FOR WORKS MADE BY AUTONOMOUS
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
This Part explains why current copyright laws fail to adequately
address the copyright ownership question. To do this, it analyzes three
types of sources: Congress, the federal courts, and the Copyright Office.
A. Congress and the Federal Courts Have Yet to Address Autonomous
Artificial Intelligence
Congress has remained silent on the issue of artificial intelligence, and
there appears to be only one recent action on the topic. In May 2017,
Congress recognized that “[a]rtificial intelligence is no longer science
fiction” and established the Artificial Intelligence Caucus.59 The Caucus
is designed “to inform policymakers of the technological, economic and
social impacts of advances in AI and to ensure that rapid innovation in
AI and related fields benefits Americans as fully as possible.”60 Without
more, however, this action fails to provide guidance as to copyright
ownership for works made by autonomous artificial intelligence.
57. FINAL: Wisconsin 51, UNLV 17, BIG TEN NETWORK (Sept. 1, 2011), http://btn.com/
2011/09/01/first-quarter-wisconsin-20-unlv-0/ [https://perma.cc/9WD5-F28D]; accord Steve
Lohr, In Case You Wondered, a Real Human Wrote This Column, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/11/business/computer-generated-articles-are-gaining-traction.
html [https://perma.cc/69W5-PHN4].
58. Podolny, supra note 56.
59. Press Release, John K. Delaney, U.S. Congressman, Delaney Launches Bipartisan
Artificial Intelligence (AI) Caucus for 115th Congress (May 24, 2017), https://delaney.house.gov/
news/press-releases/delaney-launches-bipartisan-artificial-intelligence-ai-caucus-for-115th-congress
[https://perma.cc/DHW6-7A24].
60. Id.
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Similarly, federal courts have yet to face a copyright case involving
artificial intelligence. The only case that has addressed nonhuman
authorship is Naruto v. Slater.61 There, a monkey named Naruto took
pictures of itself using photographer David Slater’s camera, and Slater
subsequently published the pictures in a book.62 The People for Ethical
Treatment of Animals (PETA) sued Slater for copyright infringement,
alleging that Slater’s display, advertisement, and sales of the book
violated Naruto’s copyright.63 The court dismissed the case, holding that
Naruto lacked standing because “[an animal] is not an ‘author’ within the
meaning of the Copyright Act.”64 Therefore, Naruto stands for the
proposition that works created by animals belong to the public domain.65
Although this holding is a useful starting point, it fails to squarely
address autonomous artificial intelligence. Importantly, works created by
animals lack users, programmers, and companies that could be deemed
the copyright owners. Indeed, it was the idea of granting standing to an
animal that troubled the court in Naruto.66 Because works made by
autonomous artificial intelligence have users, programmers, and
companies—who could theoretically have standing—this judicial
precedent fails to properly address the question of copyright ownership
for such works.
In sum, Congress and the federal courts have yet to address the issue
of copyright ownership for works made by autonomous artificial
intelligence.
B. The Copyright Office’s Human Authorship Requirement Fails to
Properly Address Autonomous Artificial Intelligence
In arriving at its holding, the court in Naruto deferred to the Copyright
Office.67 It noted that “[w]hen interpreting the Copyright Act, the courts
defer to the Copyright Office’s interpretations in the appropriate
circumstances.”68 The court accepted the Office’s Human Authorship
Requirement, discussed below, without discussion.69 Because Congress
61. No. 15-CV-04324-WHO, 2016 WL 362231 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2016), aff’d, 888 F.3d
418 (9th Cir. 2018).
62. Id. at *1.
63. Id.
64. Id. at *4.
65. See id.
66. See id. at *3 (“[I]f Congress and the President intended to take the extraordinary step of
authorizing animals as well as people and legal entities to sue, they could, and should, have said
so plainly.” (quoting Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1179 (9th Cir. 2004))).
67. Id. at *4.
68. Id. (alteration omitted) (quoting Inhale, Inc. v. Starbuzz Tobacco, Inc., 755 F.3d 1038,
1041 (9th Cir. 2014)).
69. Id.
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or a federal court could similarly rely on the Office’s requirement when
addressing a work made by autonomous artificial intelligence, a thorough
analysis of the Office’s requirement is due.
The Copyright Act70 states that a copyright shall be granted for an
“original work[] of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of
expression,” yet it does not define “authorship.”71 Nonetheless, the Office
has established the Human Authorship Requirement, which states that
“[t]o qualify as a work of ‘authorship’ a work must be created by a human
being.”72 That is, “the Office will refuse to register a claim if it determines
that a human being did not create the work.”73 The requirement’s
application is straightforward in the context provided by the Office. For
example, the Office states that it will refuse to grant a copyright for
“driftwood that has been shaped . . . by the ocean”74 because no one
contributed to the creative process.75 However, in the context of
autonomous artificial intelligence, this requirement is ambiguous and
antiquated and thus fails to properly address the copyright ownership
question.
First, the Office’s application of the Human Authorship Requirement
is ambiguous with respect to autonomous artificial intelligence. The
Office states that it “will not register works produced by a
machine . . . that operates randomly or automatically without any
creative input or intervention from a human author.”76 While this rule
seems to encompass artificial intelligence, the examples provided by the
Office make this unclear. As to music, the Office states that it will not
register the result of “[t]ransposing a song from B major to C major”;77
however, Watson Beat, Jukedeck, and WaveNet, do more than just
transpose songs as they are able to renovate styles and create new
tracks.78 As to pictures, the Office states that it will not register the result
of “a mechanical weaving process that randomly produces irregular
70. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–
810 (2012)).
71. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (emphasis added); see id. § 101.
72. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 313.2
(3d ed. 2017), https://www.copyright.gov/comp3/docs/compendium.pdf [https://perma.cc/RY7TG6KE]. It should be noted, however, that the Compendium is not binding and does not have the
force and effect of law. It merely “provides instruction to agency staff regarding their statutory
duties and provides expert guidance.” Id. intro., at 1.
73. Id. § 306.
74. Id. § 313.2.
75. See id. § 306.
76. Id. § 313.2.
77. Id.
78. See Marshall, supra note 39.
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shapes in the fabric without any discernible pattern”;79 however,
DeepMind does more than just create irregular patterns as it is able to
create landscapes from random noise images.80 As to writings, the Office
fails to provide an example.81 Therefore, the application of the Human
Authorship Requirement to autonomous artificial intelligence is
ambiguous.
Second, the support behind the Human Authorship Requirement fails
to acknowledge autonomous artificial intelligence and is thus antiquated.
To support the requirement, the Office quotes language from two cases:
In re Trade-Mark Cases82 and Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v.
Sarony.83 The Office states:
The copyright law only protects “the fruits of intellectual
labor” that “are founded in the creative powers of the mind.”
Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879). Because
copyright law is limited to “original intellectual conceptions
of the author,” the Office will refuse to register a claim if it
determines that a human being did not create the work.
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58
(1884).84
First, it must be noted that both cases are more than a century old,
meaning they predate the advent of computers by more than half a
century.85 Therefore, their technological contexts shed no light on
copyright ownership for works made by autonomous artificial
intelligence. Moreover, a close inspection reveals that the cases serve as
a poor foundation for the broad bar against nonhuman authorship.
The Office cites Trade-Mark Cases for the proposition that “copyright
law only protects ‘the fruits of intellectual labor’ that ‘are founded in the
creative powers of the mind.’”86 In Trade-Mark Cases, three trademark
infringers challenged the constitutionality of the federal trademark
statutes.87 The prosecution offered two sources of constitutional power:
79. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 72.
80. See Mordvintsev et al., supra note 48.
81. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 72.
82. 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
83. 111 U.S. 53 (1884); see U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 72, § 306.
84. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 72, § 306.
85. The Electronic Numerical Integrator and Computer (ENIAC), first revealed in 1946, is
considered the first computer. See Frank da Cruz, Programming the ENIAC, COLUM. UNIV.
COMPUTING HIST. (Apr. 24, 2017), http://www.columbia.edu/cu/computinghistory/eniac.html
[https://perma.cc/F34E-GYNP].
86. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 72, § 306 (quoting In re Trade-Mark Cases,
100 U.S. 82).
87. See In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 91–92.
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the Patent and Copyright Clause and the Commerce Clause.88 In relevant
part, the Supreme Court held that trademarks were not “writings” under
the Patent and Copyright Clause because
while the word [“]writings[”] may be liberally construed, as
it has been, to include original designs for engravings, prints,
[etc.], it is only such as are original, and are founded in the
creative powers of the mind. The writings which are to be
protected are the fruits of intellectual labor, embodied in the
form of books, prints, engravings, and the like. The trademark may be, and generally is, the adoption of something
already in existence as the distinctive symbol of the party
using it.89
Therefore, Trade-Mark Cases stands for the proposition that Congress
cannot regulate trademarks under the “writings” language of the Patent
and Copyright Clause.90 Because trademarks have little in common with
works made by nonhumans, this case serves as a shaky foundation for the
Office’s broad rule.91 Moreover, the Court in Trade-Mark Cases
emphasized originality.92 This indicates that as long as the autonomous
artificial intelligence’s work is original enough—“books, prints,
engravings, and the like”93—the Court would deem it “writings” under
the Patent and Copyright Clause and thus copyrightable. Therefore, the
Office’s ban against nonhuman works is antiquated in light of TradeMark Cases.
Next, the Office cites Burrow-Giles for the proposition that “copyright
law is limited to ‘original intellectual conceptions of the author.’”94 In
Burrow-Giles, photographer Sarony sued lithographic company BurrowGiles, alleging copyright infringement of Sarony’s photograph of Oscar
Wilde.95 Burrow-Giles retorted that because photographs merely
reproduced people and objects, they were neither “writings” nor created
by an “author” under the Patent and Copyright Clause.96 The Supreme
Court held that they were:
88. See id. at 93–95.
89. Id. at 94 (emphasis added and omitted).
90. See id.
91. See Abbott, supra note 19, at 1100–01 (“[I]t seems unwise to put much emphasis on
dicta from more than a century ago to resolve the question of whether nonhumans could be
authors . . . .”).
92. In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 94 (emphasizing the word “original”).
93. Id.
94. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 72, § 306 (quoting Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co.
v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884)).
95. See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 54 (1884).
96. See id. at 56.
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By [“]writings[”] in that clause is meant the literary
productions of those authors, and congress very properly has
declared these to include all forms of writing, printing,
engravings, etchings, etc., by which the ideas in the mind of
the author are given visible expression. The only reason why
photographs were not included in the extended list in the act
of 1802 is probably that they did not exist, as photography,
as an art was then unknown, and the scientific principle on
which it rests, and the chemicals and machinery by which it
is operated, have all been discovered long since that statute
was enacted.
....
We entertain no doubt that the constitution is broad
enough to cover an act authorizing copyright of photographs,
so far as they are representatives of original intellectual
conceptions of the author.97
Therefore, Burrow-Giles stands for the proposition that the original
aspects of a photograph are copyrightable.98 While the Copyright Office
requires a human to make the original choices,99 the Court in BurrowGiles never addressed that issue.100 Rather, the Court focused on
originality,101 as in Trade-Mark Cases,102 which indicates that as long as
the choices made by the autonomous artificial intelligence are original
enough—“writing, printing, engravings, etchings, etc.”103—the resulting
photograph should be copyrightable.
Moreover, the Court in Burrow-Giles stated that the reason
photographs had not been included in the then Copyright Act was because
photographs had not existed,104 and unless they could be distinguished
97. Id. at 58 (emphasis added).
98. See id.
99. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 72, § 306 (“[T]he Office will refuse to register
a claim if it determines that a human being did not create the work.” (emphasis added)).
100. See Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 54, 56, 58.
101. See id. at 60 (holding for plaintiff only after noting that “the photograph in
question . . . is a ‘useful, new, harmonious, characteristic, and graceful picture, and . . . plaintiff
made the same . . . entirely from his own original mental conception, to which he gave visible
form by posing the said Oscar Wilde in front of the camera, selecting and arranging the costume,
draperies, and other various accessories in said photograph, arranging the subject so as to present
graceful outlines, arranging and disposing the light and shade, suggesting and evoking the desired
expression, and from such disposition, arrangement, or representation, made entirely by plaintiff,
he produced the picture in suit’” (third omission in original)).
102. See supra text accompanying note 92.
103. Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 58.
104. See id. (“The only reason why photographs were not included in the extended list in the
act of 1802 is probably that they did not exist, as photography, as an art, was then unknown, and
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from what was then copyrightable (for example, maps, charts, and
designs) they should be similarly copyrightable.105 In other words, the
Court instructed for the word “writings” to be interpreted in light of
current technologies and practices.106 Under a similar analysis, the word
“authors” must include autonomous artificial intelligence. The reason
autonomous artificial intelligence has not been included in the Copyright
Act is because such technology has never existed, and unless works made
by such machines can be distinguished from works created by what is
now deemed an author (that is, humans) their works should be similarly
copyrightable. Therefore, the Office’s broad ban against nonhuman
authorship is antiquated in light of Burrow-Giles.
In sum, because the Copyright Office’s Human Authorship
Requirement is ambiguous and antiquated with regards to works made by
autonomous artificial intelligence, the requirement fails to properly
address them.
III. POSSIBLE CHOICES: ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST EACH
APPROACH
Because there is no proper guidance from Congress, the federal courts,
or the Copyright Office as to who would own the copyright of a work
made by autonomous artificial intelligence, an analysis of all reasonable
copyright allocations is required. This Part analyzes the arguments for
and against each approach, and it separates them into three categories: (1)
the artificial intelligence as copyright owner; (2) the user, programmer,
or artificial intelligence company as copyright owner; and (3) immediate
entrance into the public domain. It concludes that the best choice is
immediate entrance into the public domain.
A. The Artificial Intelligence as Copyright Owner
The first approach is allocating copyright ownership to the artificial
intelligence itself by defining the term “author” to include artificial
intelligence.107 In effect, this argument seeks to amend § 101 of the
Copyright Act to the following:
the scientific principle on which it rests, and the chemicals and machinery by which it is operated,
have all been discovered long since that statute was enacted.”).
105. See id. at 57 (“Unless, therefore, photographs can be distinguished in the classification
on this point from the maps, charts, designs, engravings, etchings, cuts, and other prints, it is
difficult to see why Congress cannot make them the subject of copyright as well as the others.”).
106. See id.
107. See Kalin Hristov, Artificial Intelligence and the Copyright Dilemma, 57 J. FRANKLIN
PIERCE CTR. INTELL. PROP. 431, 440–41 (2017).
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An “author” may be a natural person or a computer for
purposes of this Act.
As previously mentioned, the Copyright Act grants a copyright for an
“original work[] of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of
expression,”108 yet it defines neither “authorship” nor “author.”109 The
argument for this approach states that as long as the requirements of
originality and fixation—“the two ‘fundamental criteria of copyright
protection’”—are met, the copyright should be granted to the creating
entity.110
As for originality, the law is settled that a minimal amount of
originality will suffice regardless of the artistic merit.111 In Alfred Bell &
Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts,112 the court noted that
nothing in the Constitution commands that copyrighted
matter be strikingly unique or novel. . . . All that is needed
to satisfy both the Constitution and the statute is that the
“author” contributed something more than a “merely trivial”
variation, something recognizably “his own.” Originality in
this context “means little more than a prohibition of actual
copying.” No matter how poor artistically the “author’s”
addition, it is enough if it be his own.
....
[E]ven if [the author’s] substantial departures from the
paintings were inadvertent, the copyrights would be valid. A
copyist’s bad eyesight or defective musculature, or a shock
caused by a clap of thunder, may yield sufficiently
distinguishable variations. Having hit upon such a variation
unintentionally, the “author” may adopt it as his and
copyright it.113
Therefore, a work is original unless it is an exact copy of something
else.114 Because the artificial intelligence at issue do not merely copy
108. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
109. Id. § 101.
110. See Samuelson, supra note 12, at 1197, 1199 (quoting H.R. REP NO. 1476, at 51 (1976)).
111. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 14, § 2.01[B][1].
112. 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951).
113. Id. at 102–05 (footnotes omitted) (first quoting Chamberlin v. Uris Sales Corp., 150
F.2d 512, 513 (2d Cir. 1945) and then quoting Hoague-Sprague Corp. v. Frank C. Meyer, Inc., 31
F.2d 583, 586 (E.D.N.Y. 1929)).
114. See id. at 103.
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another’s work,115 the resulting works are sure to meet the low standard
of originality.116
As for fixation, the Copyright Act states that the work must be “fixed
in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed,
from which [it] can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”117
In Midway Manufacturing Co. v. Dirkschneider,118 a video-game
manufacturer brought suit alleging copyright infringement.119 The
defendant argued, among other things, that the copyrights on the
videogames were invalid for lack of fixation.120 The court disagreed:
Under [the Copyright Act], it is clear that the plaintiff’s
audiovisual works are fixed in the printed circuit boards. The
printed circuit boards are tangible objects from which the
audiovisual works may be perceived for a period of time
more than transitory. The fact that the audiovisual works
cannot be viewed without a machine does not mean the
works are not fixed.121
Therefore, a work is fixed when it is on readable electronic
hardware.122 Because works created by artificial intelligence can be
stored in a computer’s memory and computer memory can be read using
a computer, such works are fixed.123 In sum, because the works created
by artificial intelligence are able to meet the two statutory requirements
of originality and fixation, the argument goes, they ought to be the owners
of the resulting copyright.124
The main arguments against this approach are standing125 and wasted
incentive.126 First, as previously mentioned, only humans have standing
under the Copyright Act.127 Granting standing to artificial intelligence
115. See supra notes 33–58 and accompanying text.
116. See Samuelson, supra note 12, at 1199.
117. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
118. 543 F. Supp. 466 (D. Neb. 1981).
119. Id. at 472.
120. Id. at 479.
121. Id. at 480.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See Samuelson, supra note 12, at 1199 (“Machines may be capable of exhibiting
sufficient originality to qualify for copyright, and may be able to express that originality in a
tangible form. What basis, then, would there be for denying a copyright to a computer?”).
125. See Hristov, supra note 107, at 441.
126. See Samuelson, supra note 12, at 1199.
127. See Naruto v. Slater, No. 15-CV-04324-WHO, 2016 WL 362231, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan.
28, 2016) (“The issue for me is whether Next Friends have demonstrated that the Copyright Act
confers standing upon [an animal]. In light of the plain language of the Copyright Act, past judicial
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would lead to many unsettling questions: Who enforces the right? What
remedies should artificial intelligence be granted? What other rights
should artificial intelligence receive?128 Although these questions may
one day have to be answered, there is currently no pressing need because
sentient artificial intelligence has yet to come.129 Second, the Patent and
Copyright Clause makes clear that copyright law was established to
incentivize people to create works by offering them exclusive rights,130
thereby “promot[ing] the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”131
Currently, computers need no incentive to create; they merely require
electricity to create.132 Thus, the financial incentive that results from a
copyright would be meaningless to a computer.133
In sum, while an autonomous artificial intelligence might be the
statutory creator of its work under the Copyright Act, allocating the
copyright to the artificial intelligence would result in overwhelming and
unnecessary legal uncertainty, and it would be contrary to the goal of the
Patent and Copyright Clause.
B. The User, Programmer, or Artificial Intelligence Company as
Copyright Owner
The second approach is allocating copyright ownership to the user,
programmer, or artificial intelligence company by expanding the “work
for hire” doctrine. Under the Copyright Act, copyright ownership initially
vests in the author.134 However, in the case of a “work made for hire,”
ownership is transferred to the “employer.”135 Currently, a work is a
“work made for hire” either when it is created by an employee or when,
among other things, it is commissioned.136 This argument seeks to add a
third condition that includes works created by artificial intelligence.137
Special copyright ownership provisions exist for “computergenerated” works in the United Kingdom,138 New Zealand,139 and
interpretations of the Act’s authorship requirement, and guidance from the Copyright Office, they
have not.”), aff’d, 888 F.3d 418 (9th Cir. 2018).
128. See Hristov, supra note 107, at 441.
129. See Abbott, supra note 19, at 1114.
130. See Samuelson, supra note 12, at 1199.
131. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
132. See Samuelson, supra note 12, at 1199.
133. See Hristov, supra note 107, at 444.
134. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2012).
135. Id. § 201(b).
136. Id. § 101.
137. See Annemarie Bridy, Coding Creativity: Copyright and the Artificially Intelligent
Author, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 5, 26 (2012).
138. See Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, c. 48, § 9(3) (U.K.).
139. See Copyright Act of 1994, § 5(2)(a) (N.Z.).
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Ireland.140 There, “computer-generated” works are defined as works
generated by computer where there is no human author.141 Ownership for
such works is allocated to “the person by whom the arrangements
necessary for the creation of the work are undertaken.”142 Using this
framework, this argument seeks to amend the definition of “work made
for hire” to include the definition of “computer-generated.”143 More
specifically, this argument seeks to amend § 101 of the Copyright Act to
the following:
A “work made for hire” is—
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his
or her employment; or
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a
contribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion
picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a
supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional
text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if
the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by
them that the work shall be considered a work made for
hire. . . . ; or
(3) a work generated by a computer in circumstances such
that there is no human author of the work.144
With this amendment, copyright ownership for works created by
artificial intelligence would vest in the “employer.”145 Determining the
“employer” in any given case—between the user, the programmer, and
artificial intelligence company—would be a question of fact likely
determined under agency law.146
140. See Copyright and Related Rights Act 2000, pt. II, ch. 2, § 21(f) (Act No. 28/2000) (Ir.).
141. See Copyright and Related Rights Act 2000, pt. I, § 2 (Act. No. 28/2000) (Ir.); Copyright
Act 1994, § 2 (N.Z.); Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, c. 48, § 178 (U.K.).
142. Copyright and Related Rights Act 2000, pt. II, ch. 2, § 21(f) (Act. No. 28/2000) (Ir.);
Copyright Act 1994, § 5(2)(a) (N.Z.); Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, c. 48, § 9(3)
(U.K.).
143. See Bridy, supra note 137, at 27.
144. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012); Bridy, supra note 137, at 27.
145. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b).
146. See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 740–41 (1989) (holding
that the term “employee” with respect to a “work made for hire” must be interpreted under agency
law). However, some commentators argue that courts would need to move away from this
approach with respect to artificial intelligence. See, e.g., Hristov, supra note 107, at 442 (“An
amendment of the Copyright Act . . . must diverge from the current agency law approach used to
categorize the relationship between an employee and employer . . . .”). Factors could include the
amount of user interaction required, which entity provides the required computational power, and
whether access to the artificial intelligence is free of charge. Cf. Samuelson, supra note 12, at

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,

19

Florida Law Review, Vol. 71, Iss. 1 [], Art. 5

236

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

There are several advantages to this approach. First, this approach
would reward users, programmers, and artificial intelligence companies
for the fruits of their labor.147 Second, it would incentivize them to
disclose any contribution by artificial intelligence in the creative process,
where they may otherwise withhold this information due to fear of
rejection during copyright registration.148 Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, the artificial intelligence market would benefit from the
incentives.149
However, there are issues with each of these benefits. First, this
approach would over-reward users, programmers, and companies.150 The
purpose of copyright law is to reward the “original intellectual
conceptions of the author,”151 thereby “promot[ing] the Progress of
Science and useful Arts.”152 For this reason, a programmer may rightfully
obtain a copyright for the code behind artificial intelligence;153 on the
other hand, a parent may not receive a copyright for the artistic works of
his or her child.154 The contribution by the user, programmer, and
company is akin to that of parents: They aid in the conception of the entity
that creates the work, rather than creating the work themselves. Thus,
they would be rewarded despite not contributing to the intellectual
conception of the work, contrary to the purpose of copyright law.
Moreover, they could “own everything the program was capable of
generating” by merely allowing the computer to run indefinitely.155 Thus,
they would be over-rewarded with an unlimited number of works
1202–04 (arguing that users should be granted the copyright because they cause the work to be
generated, polish the raw output, and buy or license the program).
147. Cf. Samuelson, supra note 12, at 1205 (acknowledging that “[t]he computer, after all,
simply follows the instructions of the programmer” and that “it is fair to reward the programmer
for the value attributable to this fruit of his intellectual labor, even though it may be fruit he had
not envisioned”).
148. See Hristov, supra note 107, at 450.
149. Cf. id. at 444–45 (arguing that programmers and companies should be granted copyright
ownership because otherwise “society would likely see a significant decline in AI generated works
and a decline in the overall development of the AI industry”); Samuelson, supra note 12, at 1227
(arguing that users should be granted copyright ownership because, much like traditional authors,
“they are in the best position to take the initial steps that will bring a work into the marketplace”).
150. Cf. Samuelson, supra note 12, at 1207–08 (arguing that granting the programmer
copyright ownership would “over-reward[] the programmer”).
151. See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884).
152. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
153. See Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 702 (2d Cir. 1992) (“It is
now well settled that the literal elements of computer programs, i.e., their source and object codes,
are the subject of copyright protection.”).
154. Cf. Abbott, supra note 19, at 1094–95 (“No one would exist without their parents
contributing to their conception . . . but that does not make parents inventors on their child’s
patents.”).
155. Samuelson, supra note 12, at 1208.
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produced at an unprecedented rate. Finally, they would be fully rewarded
even if they were not granted a copyright: the user would be able to freely
use or build upon the work created by the autonomous artificial
intelligence; the programmer would enhance his or her reputation and
professional desirability;156 and the artificial intelligence company would
benefit from the sales, licensing, and advertisement revenues.157
Therefore, this approach would over-reward users, programmers, and
companies.
Second, honesty in copyright registration should be required, rather
than hoped for. A sensible approach would be to require proof of
conception for owners and users of artificial intelligence. And if the
applicant knowingly omitted proof of conception or the fact that he or she
owns or uses artificial intelligence—which could be discovered, for
example, during litigation—then the copyright should be invalidated.
This framework would provide a strong incentive for honesty.
Finally, while this approach could increase the market for artificial
intelligence, it could also lead to access inequality. Under this approach,
the “employer” of the artificial intelligence becomes the copyright
owner.158 Therefore, enticed with the highly lucrative opportunity of
obtaining copyrights at an unprecedented rate, artificial intelligence
companies may decide to hoard access to autonomous artificial
intelligence, so as to always remain the “employers” and thus the
copyright owners. This would mean that only a handful of software
giants,159 in only a handful of countries,160 would have access to this
technology. Commentators strongly warn about this type of access
inequality, with one report from Stanford University stating that “AI
could widen existing inequalities of opportunity if access to AI
156. See Abbott, supra note 19, at 1106 (arguing that programmers have noneconomic
reasons to build creative computers, including “to enhance their reputations, satisfy scientific
curiosity, or collaborate with peers”).
157. Cf. Samuelson, supra note 12, at 1207 (“By keeping the program to himself and
copyrighting every piece of music . . . that the program generates, the programmer would be able
to prevent others from obtaining interests in the program’s output. If he does this, of course, the
programmer will not make any money directly from the program, although he may profit from
selling the output that the program generates. Thus, the programmer has a choice, and should not
complain about the consequences of his choice to market the program.”).
158. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
159. Cf. Who Is Winning the AI Race?, MIT TECH. REV. (June 27, 2017),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/608112/who-is-winning-the-ai-race/ [https://perma.cc/
ER3M-9MEY] (reporting a wide gap between the activity of the three leading artificial
intelligence companies—Microsoft, Google, and IBM—and any other competing company).
160. Cf. Brian O’Keefe & Nicolas Rapp, Here Are 50 Companies Leading the AI Revolution,
FORTUNE (Feb. 23, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/02/23/artificial-intelligence-companies/
[https://perma.cc/ZLB6-D3J5] (reporting that the top fifty artificial intelligence companies in the
world are located in only six different countries).
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technologies . . . is unfairly distributed across society” because “[t]hese
technologies will improve the abilities and efficiency of people who have
access to them.”161 Thus, because this approach could foster a grab-all
environment, it could result in access inequality, which commentators
point out as one of the greatest concerns regarding artificial intelligence.
In sum, this approach would over-reward users, programmers, and
companies, and it could lead to unequal access to artificial intelligence.
C. Immediate Entrance Into the Public Domain
The final approach is the work’s immediate entrance into the public
domain, whereby no copyright is granted, and everyone is free to use the
artificial intelligence’s work. According to this argument, because no
person generates the artificial intelligence’s work, no person should be
awarded the copyright.162 In effect, this argument seeks to amend
§ 201(a) of the Copyright Act to the following:
(a) Initial Ownership.—
Copyright in a work protected under this title vests initially
in the author or authors of the work. The authors of a joint
work are coowners of copyright in the work. No copyright
shall be granted for works generated by a computer in
circumstances such that there is no human author of the
work.163
With this amendment, no copyright would be granted for works created
by artificial intelligence.164
The biggest argument against this approach is lost incentive for
programmers and artificial intelligence companies.165 However, any loss
161. PETER STONE ET AL., STANFORD UNIV., ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LIFE IN 2030:
ONE HUNDRED YEAR STUDY ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 43 (2016), https://ai100.stanford.
edu/sites/default/files/ai100report10032016fnl_singles.pdf [https://perma.cc/97JB-CSR2].
162. See Samuelson, supra note 12, at 1224 (“If there is no human author of the computergenerated work, the intellectual property system has assumed no one deserves to be rewarded for
it.”).
163. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2012). This added language is borrowed from the definition of
“computer-generated” in the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Ireland. See supra notes 138–
41 and accompanying text.
164. Cf. supra notes 144–45 and accompanying text (arguing that a work created by artificial
intelligence is “a work generated by a computer in circumstances such that there is no human
author of the work”).
165. See Samuelson, supra note 12, at 1225–26 (“[T]he legislature, the executive branch,
and the courts seem to strongly favor maximizing intellectual property rewards, especially for
high technology innovators. . . . For some, the very notion of output being in the public domain
may seem to be an anathema, a temporary inefficient situation that will be much improved when
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would likely be offset by other factors. First, as discussed earlier, the user,
programmer, and companies would be fully rewarded despite a lack of
copyright.166 Moreover, as Judge Posner once stated, innovation in the
software industry is “often incremental, quickly superseded, and less
costly to develop, and innovators have a significant first-mover
advantage.”167 Therefore, the artificial intelligence industry is likely to
continue flourishing regardless of copyrights—as it has until now—
because of the incentives inherent to the artificial intelligence industry.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there is a fierce international race
as to which country will lead humanity into the age of artificial
intelligence. Russian President Vladimir Putin, for example, has called
artificial intelligence the “future . . . of all of mankind,” stating that
“[w]hoever becomes the leader in this sphere will become the ruler of the
world.”168 This race means that artificial intelligence research is likely to
continue, with or without copyrights, as a matter of national pride and
policy. In sum, there is little reason to believe that immediate entrance
into the public domain would lead to any significant loss in incentives for
programmers and artificial intelligence companies.
However, an argument can be made that all possible incentives should
be given to programmers and companies to develop artificial intelligence
for producing the “best” creative works, much like incentives should be
given for finding the best discoveries in the scientific fields. Nevertheless,
this argument is unpersuasive. For a scientific endeavor, such as antibody
sequencing for cancer therapy,169 it seems reasonable to maximize every
possible incentive for programmers and companies to develop artificial
intelligence for finding the best cancer therapy.170 After all, humanity as
a whole would benefit from such a cure. On the other hand, in creative
fields there is no need to promote, for example, the creation of every
individual property rights are recognized. Rights must be given to someone, argue those who hold
this view; the question is to whom to give rights, not whether to give them at all.”).
166. See supra notes 156–57 and accompanying text.
167. Ryan Abbott, Hal the Inventor: Big Data and Its Use by Artificial Intelligence, in BIG
DATA IS NOT A MONOLITH 187, 195 (Cassidy R. Sugimoto et al. eds., 2016).
168. Radina Gigova, Who Vladimir Putin Thinks Will Rule the World, CNN (Sept. 2, 2017,
1:07
AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/09/01/world/putin-artificial-intelligence-will-ruleworld/index.html [https://perma.cc/TU65-HNY5].
169. Cf. Abbott, supra note 19, at 1118 (explaining how artificial intelligence could sequence
antibodies for therapeutic purposes).
170. Such a cure is not difficult to envision, especially given the breakthroughs in cancer
treatments due to recent technological advances. See, e.g., Antonio Regalado, Biotech’s Coming
Cancer Cure, MIT TECH. REV. (June 18, 2015), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/538441/
biotechs-coming-cancer-cure/ [https://perma.cc/HG6K-HD3T] (discussing biotechnological
“treatments [that] work by removing molecular brakes that normally keep the body’s T cells from
seeing cancer as an enemy, and [which] have helped demonstrate that the immune system is
capable of destroying cancer”).
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possible painting. There is simply no objective, humanitarian goal. For
creative works, “[q]uality does trump quantity in every way.”171
Therefore, there is no need to give programmers and companies every
possible incentive to develop artificial intelligence for creative works.
Finally, this approach provides a unique benefit: fostering cooperation
between artificial intelligence and humans in the creative fields. Many
fear that advances in artificial intelligence will lead to an increase in
unemployment,172 and some scholars have pointed to advances in
technology as the cause of the increasing unemployment documented
since the dawn of the millennium.173 Much like automation during the
Industrial Revolution displaced those who worked in agriculture,174
artificial intelligence is estimated to displace roughly half of all jobs in
the United States in the near future.175 Indeed, some commentators call
the rise of artificial intelligence the “4th Industrial Revolution” due to
these predictions.176 World-renowned physicist Stephen Hawking went
as far as stating that “[t]he development of full artificial intelligence could
171. Michael Kaiser, Is It Quantity or Quality That Counts in the Arts?, HUFFINGTON POST,
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-kaiser/is-it-quantity-or-quality_b_859278.html
[https://perma.cc/L5KM-RYTT] (last updated July 9, 2011).
172. See, e.g., Abbott, supra note 19, at 1117 (“With the expansion of computers into
creative domains previously occupied only by people, machines threaten to displace human
inventors.”).
173. See, e.g., David Rotman, How Technology Is Destroying Jobs, MIT TECH. REV. (June
12, 2013), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/515926/how-technology-is-destroying-jobs/
[https://perma.cc/MTU6-6PUY] (“In economics, productivity—the amount of economic value
created for a given unit of input, such as an hour of labor—is a crucial indicator of growth and
wealth creation. It is a measure of progress. . . . For years after World War II, the two lines closely
tracked each other, with increases in jobs corresponding to increases in productivity. The pattern
is clear: as businesses generated more value from their workers, the country as a whole became
richer, which fueled more economic activity and created even more jobs. Then, beginning in 2000,
the lines diverge; productivity continues to rise robustly, but employment suddenly wilts. By
2011, a significant gap appears between the two lines, showing economic growth with no parallel
increase in job creation. Brynjolfsson and McAfee call it the ‘great decoupling.’ And Brynjolfsson
says he is confident that technology is behind both the healthy growth in productivity and the
weak growth in jobs.”).
174. See id. (“At least since the Industrial Revolution began in the 1700s, improvements in
technology have changed the nature of work and destroyed some types of jobs in the process. In
1900, 41 percent of Americans worked in agriculture; by 2000, it was only 2 percent.”).
175. See Carl Benedikt Frey & Michael A. Osborne, The Future Of Employment: How
Susceptible Are Jobs To Computerisation?, 114 TECH. FORECASTING & SOC. CHANGE 254, 265
(2017) (“According to our estimate, 47% of total US employment is in the high risk category,
meaning that associated occupations are potentially automatable over some unspecified number
of years, perhaps a decade or two.”).
176. See, e.g., Bernard Marr, The 4th Industrial Revolution And A Jobless Future - A Good
Thing?, FORBES (Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2017/03/03/the-4thindustrial-revolution-and-a-jobless-future-a-good-thing/#ea1bb2b44a5e [https://perma.cc/R4334ACF].
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spell the end of the human race,”177 and Elon Musk, founder of Tesla
Motors and SpaceX, has likewise compared artificial intelligence to
“summoning [a] demon”178—and they are not alone.179 Regardless of
labels, it is clear that artificial intelligence is likely to drastically change
the employment landscape in the near future, and it is imperative to
ensure that humans remain an integral part of fields that do not
necessarily require complete automation—such as the creative fields.180
Immediate entrance into the public domain would help ensure just this.
More specifically, human contribution would be required to obtain
copyrights from the artificial intelligence’s raw output.181
In sum, immediate entrance into the public domain is the best
approach to resolving the question of copyright ownership of works
created by autonomous artificial intelligence. The artificial intelligence
industry will likely continue to thrive regardless of copyrights, and this
approach would help ensure that humans remain an integral part of
creative fields.
CONCLUSION
The increasing sophistication and proliferation of artificial
intelligence has given rise to a pressing question: Who is the copyright
owner of a work created by autonomous artificial intelligence? Thus far,
Congress has remained silent on the issue, federal courts have yet to face
the question, and the little guidance provided by the Copyright Office is
ambiguous and antiquated. Out of the possible choices, immediate
entrance into the public domain is the best option.
Allocation of copyright ownership to the artificial intelligence would
lead to nonhuman standing, which would lead to unnecessary uncertainty
in the legal system. This would also lead to lost incentives, which is
contrary to the goals of the Patent and Copyright Clause of the
Constitution. Likewise, allocation to the user, programmer, or artificial
177. Rory Cellan-Jones, Stephen Hawking Warns Artificial Intelligence Could End Mankind,
BBC NEWS (Dec. 2, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-30290540 [https://perma.cc/
EUV2-PSYW].
178. David Shukman, How Safe Can Artificial Intelligence Be?, BBC NEWS (Sept. 15, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-34249500 [https://perma.cc/56UY-THLZ].
179. See, e.g., Dion Dassanayake, Bill Gates Joins Stephen Hawking in Warning Artificial
Intelligence Is a Threat to Mankind, EXPRESS (Jan. 29, 2015), https://www.express.co.uk/
news/world/555092/Bill-Gates-Stephen-Hawking-Artificial-Intelligence-AI-threat-mankind
[https://perma.cc/ZV46-6WV3] (noting that Microsoft founder Bill Gates agrees with Stephen
Hawkins and Elon Musk regarding the dangers of artificial intelligence).
180. See supra notes 169–71 and accompanying text (arguing that there is no need to
maximize every possible incentive for developing artificial intelligence for the creative fields).
181. See supra notes 162–64 and accompanying text (noting that, under this approach, a
work created by artificial intelligence would enter the public domain only when there is a lack of
human contribution).
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intelligence company would lead to over-rewarding, and it could lead to
unequal access to artificial intelligence. On the other hand, immediate
entrance into the public domain would ensure that the users,
programmers, and companies are adequately rewarded, and it would
ensure that humans remain an integral part of the creative fields.
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